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Historical reasons for the focus on broad monetary aggregates in post-WW2 
Britain and the ‘Seven Years War’ with the IMF 
 
C.A.E. GOODHART* and D.J. NEEDHAM** 
*London School of Economics 
**Darwin College, University of Cambridge 
 
Abstract 
The British monetary authorities have traditionally focused on broader monetary 
aggregates than their counterparts elsewhere.  The reasons include: the willingness of 
UK banks to allow customers to make payments by drawing on time deposits, the 
particularities of the UK approach to managing the national debt and the foreign 
exchange reserves, and the flow-of-funds system of national accounts developed after 
World War II.  This article outlines these reasons, and explores the implications for 
the UK’s often-fractious relationship with the International Monetary Fund during the 
1950s and 1960s.  It explains why IMF conditionality on loans to the UK focused on 
broad aggregates. 
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Introduction 
 
Two main characteristics differentiated post-war British monetary analysis and 
management from those of most other developed countries.  First, monetary targetry 
in the UK focused primarily on a broad money aggregate, M3 or £M3, comprising 
both sight (demand) deposits and time and savings deposits, equally weighted.1  This 
                                                 
1
 M3 comprised currency in circulation with the public (excluding cash in banks’ vaults but 
including non-UK residents’ currency holdings) and (sterling and foreign currency) deposits 
of UK (public and private) residents with UK banks.  £M3 comprised currency in circulation 
with the public and the sterling deposits of UK residents.  Currently the focus is on M4, 
which comprises the UK private sector’s holdings of sterling currency, sterling deposits with 
UK banks, and building society shares, deposits and sterling certificates of deposit.  The 
 2 
contrasted with procedures in most other countries, which focused on a narrow 
monetary aggregate, such as M1, and gave either no weight, or less weight (as in 
Germany) to time and savings deposits.2  British practice in this respect derived from 
longstanding behaviour whereby UK banks have traditionally allowed clients to make 
payments by drawing on their time deposits.  The dividing line in the UK between 
(monetary) sight deposits and (quasi-money) time and other deposits was therefore 
more porous than in most other countries.  By the same token, and unlike in the USA 
and Germany, cash and liquidity ratios were applied equally to all deposits. 
UK private sector residents’ bank deposits in this period comprised the bulk of 
total bank liabilities, which must equal bank assets.3  Focusing on a broad monetary 
aggregate led naturally to the second distinguishing characteristic of British monetary 
analysis and management  the credit counterparts approach, since the broad 
monetary aggregate is the counterpart of bank lending to the public, private, and 
overseas sectors.  In contrast, focusing on a narrow monetary aggregate in a flow-of-
funds framework would have required assessment of likely flows between sight and 
other kinds of bank deposits, which were neither easily predictable nor easily subject 
to any official control. 
                                                                                                                                           
increasing liquidity of building society shares led to their inclusion in M4 from 1987, 
‘Measures of broad money’, BEQB, 27, no. 2 (May 1987), p. 212, n. 2; Hotson (2010), p. 41. 
2
 M1 comprised currency in circulation with the public and UK private sector residents’ sight 
deposits with UK banks.  Before 1975, M1 deposits were defined as current accounts against 
which cheques could be drawn.  Public sector deposits were excluded. 
3
 With due adjustment for changes in non-deposit liabilities such as bank equity.  Deposits as 
a percentage of total clearing bank liabilities rose from 79 per cent in 1880 to 94 per cent in 
1966, peaking at 96 per cent in 1953, Sheppard (1971), pp. 126-7. 
 3 
The credit counterparts approach contrasted with the dominant academic 
theory of the determination of the money stock from the late 1930s, which focused on 
the money multiplier.  This linked the money stock, broad or narrow, to the monetary 
base provided by the central bank and two ratios: the public’s currency/deposit ratio, 
and the banks’ reserve/deposit ratio (Phillips, 1920; Keynes, 1930; Meade, 1934; 
Sayers, 1938).  Like the flow-of-funds approach, this was derived from a statistical 
identity, and in neither case could one assume a direction of causation.  The main 
problem with the money multiplier approach has been that almost always, almost 
everywhere, central banks have chosen to set an official short-term interest rate, not a 
fixed quantity of base money (that is, prior to reaching the Zero Lower Bound).  
Consequently, central banks must passively provide just that quantity of base money 
consistent with the officially chosen short-term interest rate.  Therefore, the money 
multiplier actually works in reverse, determining the monetary base with (broad) 
money growth influenced, inter alia, by the officially chosen level of short-term 
interest rates (Goodhart, 2009; Goodhart, 2016; Goodhart, 2017 and Goodhart, 
Bartsch and Ashworth, 2016). 
It would have been physically possible for any central bank, including the 
Bank of England (the ‘Bank’), to reverse engines and control the quantity of base 
money, allowing (short-term) interest rates to fluctuate as they willed.  But given 
banks’ inelastic demand for base money, fluctuations would likely have been volatile.  
In view of the UK’s high post-war debt ratio, the fragile structure of the gilts market, 
with the jobbers (the market makers) being too lightly capitalised, and the need to 
maintain investor confidence, the authorities, especially the Bank but also HM 
Treasury, reacted strongly against proposals for monetary control that put financing of 
the national debt, and the existing structure of money and gilts markets, at risk. 
 4 
After the Second World War, British banks were large holders of (mostly 
short-dated) public sector debt.  It was apparent to any careful observer that, if the 
Bank wanted to maintain a given level of short-term (Treasury bill) rates, the banking 
system could generate whatever reserve base it wanted.  But academic theories, even 
when wrong, are hard to kill off.  The then doyen of British monetary economists, 
Richard Sayers, retreated from espousing a cash ratio theory to treating the liquidity 
ratio as the effective fulcrum for monetary control in subsequent editions of his 
textbook Modern Banking.4  But Bank officials were then just as leery about allowing 
(encouraging) gilt prices to fluctuate in an uncontrolled fashion (in the hope of 
managing net debt sales better), so in practice the liquidity ratio multiplier was just as 
analytically back-to-front as a cash ratio multiplier.5  Nevertheless the possibility of 
some measure of ratio control (exerting pressure on the banks’ liquidity ratio with, for 
example, calls for Special Deposits) remained a concept that cropped up in the British 
authorities’ thinking from time to time.6  There was often a degree of confusion in the 
Bank and Treasury between multiplier analysis (whether via the liquidity or cash 
                                                 
4
 In the original 1938 edition Sayers suggested that the ‘customary’ 9 per cent cash ratio was 
‘more rigid’ than the liquid assets ratio and that ‘banks, subject to the supply of “cash” and 
the public’s demand for cash, have absolute control over the volume of deposits’, Sayers 
(1938), p. 34-5.  In the 7
th
 (1967) edition, he explained that ‘the reader must take it as one of 
the facts of the current situation, that the operative restraint on expansion of bank credit is the 
28 per cent. ratio, while within the total of liquid assets the operators see to it that 8 of the 28 
shall consist of cash’, Sayers (1967), pp. 38-9. 
5
 Bank of England, ‘Operations in the gilt-edged market’, BEQB, 16, no. 6 (June, 1966), pp. 
141-8. 
6
 Special Deposits were introduced in 1958 and required deposit-taking banks to post a 
percentage of their gross advances at the Bank during times of credit restraint. 
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ratio), which was taught almost universally in academia, and the flow-of-funds 
approach which was what the UK authorities, but not most academics, really believed. 
We discuss the genesis of the flow-of-funds approach, then in its infancy, 
below.  It was particularly attractive to the UK authorities because it focused on four 
main economic developments which the authorities regarded as crucial for policy.  
These were (1) the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement; (2) net sales of public 
sector debt to the non-bank public, which together, more or less, determined the 
residual bank lending to the public sector; (3) bank lending to the private sector; and 
(4) net overseas flows, whose statistical treatment was complex, as we show.  If the 
authorities could control the first three (domestic credit expansion – ‘DCE’) then, 
assuming a stable demand for money function, net external flows and reserve 
accumulation could be controlled. 
In practice none of these three components of DCE could be closely 
controlled.  Once the annual budget had set expenditure plans and tax rates, public 
sector expenditures depended on how strictly the Treasury could hold the spending 
departments, and the local authorities and nationalised industries, to their prior plans, 
while tax receipts were endogenous to the economic cycle.  The authorities were 
unwilling to force gilt sales onto a weak market, partly out of concern for the 
solvency of the jobbers, partly because they feared that expectations would be auto-
regressive, and partly for fear of damaging longer-run confidence about the safety of 
investing in gilts.  So gilt sales tended to come in bursts, (at unpredictable times), 
interspersed with periods of much lower, or even negative sales. 
That left the third major component, bank lending to the private sector.  But 
such lending was not seen as elastic in response to the scale of variation that the 
authorities were prepared to countenance in official short term rates, i.e. Bank rate, 
 6 
given the various factors, external and domestic, weighing on the Chancellor’s 
interest rate decisions.  All that meant in practice, during the years from 1945 until 
Competition and Credit Control in 1971, that the authorities (led by the Treasury, 
unhappily followed by the Bank) would reach for directly applied ceilings on bank 
lending to the private sector whenever there was a perceived need for a check to 
domestic credit and monetary growth. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), under the analytical direction of 
Jacques Polak, preferred a simpler (‘Western Hemisphere’) model based on the 
money multiplier approach.  Faced with the UK authorities’ insistence that such a 
model was inappropriate for the UK, the Fund, after lengthy discussion described 
below, became prepared to work with the UK authorities within the context of a flow-
of-funds model.7  Indeed, the Fund insisted at the time of heavy UK drawing in 1969 
that DCE, as defined above, could, and should, be limited and controlled. 
By the end of the 1960s, the monetary authorities in the UK had firmly tied 
themselves to the joint position of focusing on a broad money target and using a flow-
of-funds analysis for forecasting and (attempted) control purposes.  This was not, of 
course, the end of the story.  The expansion of the money stock in the years 1971-74 
was more exaggerated in broad money (M3) than in narrow money (as recurred again 
in 1980-81).  This led British monetarists, and much of the Conservative party, to 
focus on M3 as the underlying cause of the subsequent inflation in the mid-1970s, 
                                                 
7
 A 1965 internal Bank paper, drafted by Andrew Bain, had set out just such a model, Bank of 
England Archive (hereinafter, ‘BOE’), 6A50/1, A.D. Bain, ‘Some factors affecting the money 
supply’, 9 December 1965. With the agreement of the Bank this is available at 
www.centreforfinancialhistory.org. 
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while it led some Bank officials from time to time to regard M1 as a truer measure of 
the ‘thrust’ of monetary policy. 
Much of the history of the conduct of monetary policy during these years has 
already been set out, not least in the official histories of the Bank of England by 
Fforde and Capie (Fforde, 1992; Capie, 2010).  The particular contribution of this 
article lies instead in the detailed historical study of the largely statistical discussions 
between the Bank and the IMF, whereby the Bank eventually persuaded a reluctant 
Fund that monetary conditionality, and later targets (whether for domestic credit or 
the money stock), in the UK should be based on broad aggregates. 
 
Current accounts and fixed deposits 
 
In April 1861, launching its inaugural half-yearly banking supplement, the Economist 
newspaper recommended that the ‘perfect Report of a Joint Stock Bank’ should state 
‘what are the deposits, distinguishing between those held at call and those which are 
to be repaid only at the expiration of a certain stipulated notice’.8  As René Higgonet 
points out, however, ‘most banks did not distinguish between current accounts and 
fixed deposits’ in the nineteenth century (Higgonet 1957, p. 333).  Even after the 
Economist first aggregated the banking data in October 1877, and began publishing 
monthly figures for (most of) the London joint stock banks from August 1891, it was 
                                                 
8
 James Wilson (proprietor) and Walter Bagehot (editor from 1861) wanted the Economist to 
be ‘the leading statistical journal of its day’, Dudley Edwards (1993), p. 274; Economist, 6 
April 1861, pp. 366-7. 
 8 
difficult to distinguish current and deposit accounts.9  As financial journalist Hartley 
Withers later explained: ‘if a customer wished to remove deposit funds immediately, 
very few bankers would refuse to permit him to do so’.10  This remained the position 
in 1930 when the Managing Director of the Midland Bank, Frederick Hyde, explained 
to the (Macmillan) Committee on Finance and Industry: 
 
We must bear in mind that our deposits are in a very considerable part payable 
on demand, and even those deposits that are fixed for a period may be payable 
on demand by arrangement with the depositor.
11
. 
 
Nonetheless, considering ‘exact quantitative knowledge concerning the chief elements 
of the monetary and financial system’ to be ‘of the utmost importance’, the 
Macmillan Committee obtained, and published, a breakdown of current accounts 
(‘sums payable on demand’) and deposit accounts (‘sums payable after a date or 
notice’) at the ten London Clearing Banks and the six Scottish banks since 1919 
(Macmillan Report, 1931, p. 174 and pp. 283-95; Capie and Webber 1985, pp. 259-
60).  On the Committee’s recommendation, disaggregated data continued to be 
published, first in the Bank of England Statistical Summary and then in the Monthly 
                                                 
9
 In January 1891, following the Baring crisis, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Goschen 
called for the joint stock banks to provide monthly financial statements, Goschen (1905), pp. 
116-7; ‘Statement of bank accounts in a summarised form’ Economist, 20 October 1877  
(supplement), pp. 3-5; ‘The first of the monthly bank accounts’, Economist, 8 August 1891, p. 
1031. 
10
 The Post Office Savings Bank also permitted depositors to withdraw time deposits on 
demand, Sheppard (1971), p. 8; Withers (1910), p. 102. 
11
 Macmillan Report (1931), p. 37. 
 9 
Digest of Statistics, as well as the Economist.12  The divide between current and 
deposit accounts remained porous, however.  As Sayers pointed out in 1938: 
 
banks will transfer balances from one of their own classes to the other without 
hesitation – they leave the distribution of deposits entirely in their customers’ 
hands.  The banks decide the total volume of deposits; but the public, directly 
at least, decides the distribution between the Cash Deposits and Savings 
Deposit categories.
13
 
 
This remained the case after the standardisation of seven-day terms for deposit 
accounts in 1955 (Radcliffe 1959, paras 131-2; Wadsworth 1973, p. 125).  In June 
1958 the National Institute of Economic and Social Research included in its definition 
of the money supply ‘deposit accounts in the joint stock banks, the restrictions on 
transfer being such that the accounts can be regarded as de facto transferable “without 
restriction”.14 
 
                                                 
12
 The Bank of England Statistical Summary was produced for internal use from 1926 and 
circulated amongst other central banks from 1927.   Enlarged in 1928, it circulated amongst 
certain government departments from 1930, and was published from 1932 on the 
recommendation of the Macmillan Committee, BEQB, 16, no. 4 (December, 1976), p. 437; 
Sayers (1976), p. 383, n. 2. 
13
 Between August 1936 and May 1937 the Federal Reserve increased the reserve 
requirements for member banks, from 3 per cent to 6 per cent for time deposits and from 7-13 
per cent to 14-26 per cent for demand deposits (depending on location), Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (1943), p. 400; Sayers (1938), p. 248. 
14
 Radcliffe (1959) Principal memoranda of evidence, vol. 3, p. 5, n. 1. 
 10 
Cash ratios and liquidity ratios 
 
In 1861, the Economist also warned against judging a bank primarily by the 
adequacy of its capital.  Rather: 
 
we should add together all the liabilities of the bank – its circulation, its drafts, 
and its deposits: see what the total is carefully; and then we should compare it 
with the amount of cash, loans to bill brokers, Government securities, and 
other immediately tangible and convertible assets which the bank has in hand.  
If the available money bears a good proportion to the possible claims, the bank 
is a good and secure bank.
15
  
 
On the question of ‘the specific proportion between the cash reserve and the liabilities 
of the bank’ the newspaper refused to ‘lay down any technical or theoretical rule’.  
The cash ratio must be allowed ‘to vary in some degree with the nature of the bank’s 
business’.  Seventy years later, the Macmillan Committee largely agreed: 
 
The monetary system of this country must be a Managed System – It is not 
advisable, or indeed practicable, to regard our monetary system as an 
automatic system, grinding out the right result by the operation of natural 
forces aided by a few maxims of general application and some well worn rules 
of thumb.
16
  
 
                                                 
15
 Economist, 6 April 1861, pp. 366-7.   
16
 Macmillan Report (1931), para. 280. 
 11 
According to the Committee, the monetary authorities should manage the price level 
by changing ‘the quantity and terms of credit’ principally by adjusting Bank rate (‘a 
most delicate and beautiful instrument’).17  As Sayers wrote in 1938, ‘the tendency 
nowadays is to regulate cash ratios not in the interests of bank liquidity but in the 
interests of central bank control over aggregate bank deposits’ – what officials 
referred to as the ‘Macmillan process’.18  But unlike the US Federal Reserve, which 
required member banks to keep 6 per cent of their time deposits and 14-26 per cent of 
their sight deposits in cash, the UK monetary authorities did not differentiate between 
sight and time deposits (Sayers 1938, pp. 43-4 and 254-8).  There was no incentive, 
from a reserves perspective, for British banks to steer customers towards deposit 
rather than current accounts. 
 The requirements of wartime finance forced what the Midland Bank identified 
as ‘a radical alteration of the “cause and effect” relation between bank cash and 
deposits’.19  As government revenues fell short of current expenditures, (and after 
                                                 
17
 Clearing banks’ liquidity ratios rose from c. 20 per cent in the 1880s to over 30 per cent 
during WWI before declining to c. 20 per cent during WW2.  While there was no statutory 
minimum, the Bank indicated in 1951 that ‘it would be totally unacceptable if the ratio 
dropped below 25 per cent’, Turner (2014), p. 182; Sheppard (1971), pp. 126-7; Macmillan 
Report (1931), paras. 211, 218 and 303. 
18
 Sayers (1938), p. 44; The National Archives, London (hereinafter ‘TNA’), T233/481, 
‘D.P.T. Jay to R.S. Cripps’, 28 February 1948. 
19
 Nevin and Davis suggest causality was reversing with the ‘open back-door’ policy of the 
late 1930s, whereby the banks could replenish cash reserves by selling large volumes of 
Treasury bills to the Bank at market rates without reducing advances, Nevin and Davis 
(1970), pp. 141-2; ‘The changing shape of Britain’s monetary system, part I: 1931-45’, 
Midland Bank Review (November 1947), p. 4. 
 12 
sales of British Government securities to the non-bank public and foreign loans), the 
Exchequer was forced to borrow from the banks, largely in the form of bank 
purchases of additional Treasury Deposit Receipts and Treasury bills.  The 
counterpart of such additional loans to the public sector was mainly higher private 
sector deposits (via Government expenditure), which required the banks to maintain 
higher cash reserves to preserve their (informal) cash ratios.20  To support the higher 
level of deposits necessary for increased government borrowing from the banks, the 
Bank had to supply more cash to the banks through open market operations.  This was 
the reverse of the ‘Macmillan process’, with cash reserves now determined by the 
volume of aggregate deposits.21 
With the national debt peaking at 238 per cent of GDP after the Second World 
War and the banks extremely liquid, the authorities were forced to extend wartime 
financial repression.  In 1946 the cash ratio was formalised with the clearing banks 
required to hold 8 per cent of their total deposit liabilities in notes, coin, and reserves 
at the Bank.22  With the banks holding so many near-money assets, and the Bank 
prepared to monetise these on demand, there was no question of controlling lending 
                                                 
20
 Treasury Deposit Receipts (TDRs) were introduced as a wartime expedient in July 1940 
and existed until 1952.  The London clearing, Scottish, and two overseas banks were 
instructed to place non-transferable deposits, usually of 6 months, with the Treasury.   TDRs 
could be switched for gilts or sold to the Bank for ‘emergency purposes’ so were less liquid 
than Treasury bills, Allen (2012), p. 812n. 
21
 TNA, T233/481, ‘E.E. Bridges to R.V.N Hopkins’, 27 February 1948. 
22
 BEQB, 2, no. 4 (December, 1962) p. 251. 
 13 
via the cash ratio, a notion described as ‘risible’ by one former Bank economist.23  In 
order to keep interest rates and the cost of government finance stable, the Bank 
continued to supply whatever cash the banks demanded.24  In 1951, the cash ratio was 
supplemented with a request that the clearing banks hold 28-32 per cent of their total 
deposits in liquid assets: cash, money at call with the discount houses, eligible 
commercial bills, and UK Treasury bills.25  These measures had little to do with 
prudential financial management.  Nor were they attempts to regulate bank lending 
through the operation of a multiplier.  As the Governor admitted in 1958, they were 
principally about directing the nation’s savings into government debt so the Bank 
could avoid ‘a continual state of anxiety as to how the Government’s requirements for 
finance for the following week were going to be met’ .26  When the liquidity ratio was 
formalised in 1951, the banks were ‘forced’ to switch about £500 million of Treasury 
bills for ‘serial funding stock’.27  This reduced their liquid assets from 39 per cent of 
total deposits to 32 per cent (Radcliffe 1959, para. 406). 
                                                 
23
 Former Bank economist Anthony Hotson cites M.D.K.W. Foot , C.A.E. Goodhart and A.C. 
Hotson, ‘Monetary base control’, BEQB, 19, no. 2 (June, 1979), pp. 149-59 in Hotson (2017), 
p. 147.   
24
 ‘The management of money day by day’, BEQB, 3, no. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 15-21.  
25
 This included the cash ratio, BEQB, 2, no. 4 (December, 1962) p. 252. 
26
 Radcliffe, Minutes of evidence, para. 2621; Nobay (1973), p. 48. 
27
 The £1 billion ‘serial funding stock’ issued (of which about £500 million was sold to the 
banks) in November 1951 comprised three tranches:  £450 million maturing in November 
1952, £200 million in November 1953 and £350 million in November 1954.  Short maturities 
meant ‘apart from nomenclature, the forced funding amounted to little more than a rise in the 
rate of interest paid to the banks for holding floating debt’, Dow (1970), p. 230; Allen (2014), 
p. 27 and p. 56.  
 14 
The liquidity ratio was consistent with the arrangements developed during the 
‘cheap money’ period.  These arrangements rested on three (non-statutory) 
agreements: 
 
1. An informal, but effective, clearing bank cartel that fixed deposit and lending 
rates in return for a monopoly on the payments system.  This was one of the 
factors that enabled the authorities to continue their direct repression of bank 
lending during times of strain.28 
2. A discount house/clearing bank agreement that gave the discount houses a 
virtual monopoly over the Treasury bill tender in return for an agreement not 
to compete with the clearing banks for deposits.29  (The clearing banks 
financed the deposit houses with ‘money at call’ at a pre-agreed margin.)  
3. A Bank/discount house agreement that the discount houses would cover the 
Treasury bill tender in return for a monopoly on the Bank’s lender of last 
resort facilities. 
 
In the post-war period, the goal was to maximise sales of government debt at minimal 
cost, while all the time maintaining the value of sterling.  The authorities had to sell 
significant quantities of government debt simply to finance maturing stock before 
they could begin to tackle new Exchequer funding needs.  Quite apart from the 
theoretical objections, shifting to a system that relied on more volatile interest rates to 
                                                 
28
 TNA, T326/861, Bank of England, ‘The clearing banks’ collective agreements’, 20 August 
1968. 
29
 For the 1930s origins of the discount house/clearing bank agreement, see Balogh (1950), 
pp. 132-5; Fletcher (1976), pp. 49-51. 
 15 
exercise control through a cash ratio would have imperilled the Bank’s ability to 
finance the national debt, its primary function since its foundation in 1694.   There 
seemed little point in risking a collapse simply to refashion the monetary 
infrastructure along neater theoretical lines. 
 
Last year’s Bradshaw and the flow-of-funds  
 
In his 1956 Budget statement, Chancellor Harold Macmillan complained that ‘some 
of our statistics are too late to be as useful as they ought to be.  We are always, as it 
were, looking up a train in last year’s Bradshaw’.30  Macmillan was partly referring to 
the forecasts that had preceded R.A. Butler’s expansionary Budget the year before.31  
The subsequent boom had required a rigorous credit squeeze with Butler requesting a 
‘positive and significant’ reduction in bank advances just three months after his 
Budget.32  In March 1956 the high-level civil service Economic Steering Committee 
asked the Working Party on Statistics for Employment Policy to consider whether 
                                                 
30
 Bradshaw’s railway timetables were published annually from 1839 to 1961; HC Deb, 17 
April 1956, vol. 551, c. 867. 
31
 Butler may also have been influenced by the proximity of the May 1955 General Election, 
called four days before his Budget.  The index of production had shown little increase since 
the third quarter of 1954 leading Treasury officials to conclude that ‘the misleading 
implications of the preliminary figures for stock increases in 1954 draw particular attention to 
the need for (a) knowing what statistics you require, (b) having those you must require as 
reliable and as early as possible’, TNA, T159/9, ‘Schedule of subjects to be covered in the 
background papers’, February, 1959; Dow (1970), p. 79, n. 5. 
32
 The clearing banks agreed to reduce their advances 10 per cent by the end of 1955, Allen 
2014, pp. 112-3; HC Deb 25 July 1955 col. 544 cc 824-34; Fforde (1992), p. 640. 
 16 
existing banking and financial statistics were adequate for the formulation and 
measurement of monetary policy.33  
While the impetus came from Ministers, officials recognised in 1956 that 
better financial statistics might contribute ‘raw material for “flow of fund” analyses’.34  
The Bank described the technique as: 
 
a logical extension of the more familiar system of national accounts: it covers 
the transactions in financial assets and liabilities which accompany income 
and expenditure…by mapping out the financial transactions by sectors, it 
draws attention to the ways in which such aggregates as an increase in the 
money supply or, more generally, in liquidity can be built up (Bank of 
England 1972, p. 7).
35
 
 
National income statements aggregate flows during a particular period; flow-of-funds 
matrices ‘set out the particular routes along which funds pass between the sectors’ 
capital accounts in a particular period’ (Bank of England 1972, p. 10).  As Andrew 
Bain points out, while the matrices provide no behavioural explanations of why funds 
may be flowing in a particular direction, they forge a link between monetary policy 
and demand management (Bain 1973, p. 1055).36 
                                                 
33
 The Economic Steering Committee was chaired by the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 
and comprised the Permanent Heads of the other departments, TNA, CAB 139/459, Central 
Statistical Office, ‘Note of an informal meeting’, 14 June 1956. 
34
 BOE, EID4/56, Statistics Office, ‘Review of Banking and Financial Statistics’, 11 
September 1956. 
35
 See also de Bonis and Gigliobanco (2012), pp. 15-49. 
36
 See also Capie (2010), p. 28. 
 17 
By November 1956, the Central Statistical Office (CSO) had produced 
rudimentary flow-of-funds matrices.37  Within the Bank, John Fforde described this as 
‘pioneer work’ which would shed further light on the growth of the money supply, an 
increasing Treasury preoccupation under Peter Thorneycroft (Chancellor from 
January 1957) since ‘the change in government borrowing from the banking system is 
then combined with the change in private borrowing from that system to give us the 
change in money supply’.38  Deputy Governor Humphrey Mynors commented ‘this 
looks to me like a Sputnik, not yet at the moon, but navigating in a part of the 
universe which man has not yet reached.  Surely capable of development?’39  In 
February 1958 Economic Trends introduced graphs of the money supply defined as 
‘Total of (1) deposits at London Clearing Banks and Scottish Banks (less collections 
and identifiable items in transit), (2) deposits at the Bank of England (other than 
‘Bankers’), (3) currency in circulation with the public’.40  This was also the definition 
used in the 1958 Economic Survey.41 
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The Working Party’s inquiry was overtaken by the Committee on the Working 
of the Monetary System (the ‘Radcliffe Committee’), announced in April 1957 in 
response to the failure of tighter monetary policy to contain the Butler boom.42  The 
Radcliffe Committee was equally enthusiastic about flow-of-funds analysis, defining 
the following objectives: 
 
(i) to allow the framework of the financial structure within which monetary 
changes take place to be seen in more precise quantitative terms; 
(ii) to give the earliest possible indication of the movement of liquidity and 
of the way in which monetary pressure on demand would be likely to 
take effect; 
(iii) to give the earliest possible indication of the movement of demand in 
each part of the economy, and so enable the pressure of demand to be 
regulated satisfactorily (Radcliffe 1959, para. 798). 
 
The Committee believed that financial statistics should be ‘capable of being fitted 
together so as to show the total movement of funds, not merely the flow through 
individual financial institutions’ (Radcliffe 1959, para. 865).  As the Bank noted: ‘The 
Radcliffe Committee’s preoccupation with liquidity leads them to give particular 
attention to the flow of short-term funds and to the statistics of banks as “the largest 
suppliers of liquid funds”.43  The Committee requested data on ‘the current flows of 
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 In March 1956 Sir Robert Boothby MP suggested a ‘new Macmillan Committee’ to 
Chancellor Harold Macmillan who delayed while the credit squeeze played out, BOE, 
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funds from the financial sector as a whole to the other major sectors of the 
economy…[since] one of the principal objects of monetary analysis [was] to examine 
the interactions of these sectors on one another through financial transactions’ 
(Radcliffe 1959, paras. 808-9).  Given the importance of ‘clean’ data to flow-of-funds 
analysis, the Report gave detailed statistical recommendations, based largely on 
evidence submitted by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
(Alford 1986, p. 61).  These chimed with the earlier work of the Working Party on 
Statistics for Employment Policy.44  
Annual flow-of-funds accounts were produced from 1960.45  In September 1962 
Economic Trends explained that ‘the comprehensive nature of national income 
accounts and their analysis into sectors have made these a suitable framework for 
presenting the main “flow” items and for linking the “real” and financial accounts’.46  
This was reflected in the sector classifications: Public Sector, Private Sector, and 
Overseas Sector.47  As the authors explained: 
 
In the United Kingdom it is intended to avoid changing the present 
conventions in the national income accounts, such as those affecting sector 
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boundaries and the definitions of the gross national product, when adding the 
extra financial tables to the national income accounts – at least until 
considerable practical experience with the new figures has been obtained 
(Economic Trends, September 1962, p. xi). 
 
‘Scattered’ flow-of-funds matrices were published in September 1963 in Financial 
Statistics and the Quarterly Bulletin, and were ‘centralised’ in the 1964 National 
Income Blue Book (Alford 1986 p. 36, n. 2; Bjork and Offer 2013, p. 5).  There was 
quarterly analysis in Financial Statistics from December 1964 and the Quarterly 
Bulletin from March 1965 with more detailed analysis, and a new table setting out 
‘the factors determining changes in the money supply’ in Financial Statistics from 
June 1966.48  By 1968 the flow-of-funds matrices were being used to prepare financial 
forecasts to test the assumptions underlying the national income forecasts (Berman 
and Cassell 1968, p. xiv).  In March 1969, the prospect of tougher IMF loan criteria 
generated ‘severe pressure for earlier financial information in the near future’.49 
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The ‘Seven Years War’ with the IMF 
 
The IMF had been developing its own flow-of-funds approach based on a 
narrower definition of the money supply (Dorrance 1955; Polak 1959; Polak and. 
Boissonneault 1960).  In 1956, Director of Research Jacques Polak defined ‘money’ 
as ‘an entry, or combination of entries, on the liability side of the balance sheets of the 
banking system’ (Polak 1957, p. 11).  Recognising the arbitrariness of the distinction 
between current accounts and deposit accounts in countries such as the UK, he 
nonetheless concluded, from a theoretical perspective, that current accounts and the 
liabilities of the central bank were ‘monetary liabilities’ while deposit accounts 
(‘quasi money’) were not.  On the asset side, he divided the ‘quantity of money’ in 
two: ‘money of external origin’ – the (net) foreign assets of a country’s banking 
system; and ‘money of domestic origin’ – the domestic assets of a country’s banking 
system.  His analysis proceeded on the assumption that the income velocity of money 
was constant, and that ‘domestic credit expansion’ was exogenous, that is, ‘credit 
expansion is subject to the responsibility of the banking system’.50  From there 
followed his assertion that excessive domestic credit expansion was the primary cause 
of balance of payments deficits.  These assumptions would put the Fund on a collision 
course with the UK monetary authorities, accustomed to treating bank credit as a 
passive variable that responded to the short-term requirements of the public and 
private sectors, and who believed the velocity of circulation to be unstable (Radcliffe 
1959, para. 391).   
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 Polak agreed these assumptions were unrealistic but argued they provided ‘a clear gain in 
clarity’, Polak (1957), p. 13. 
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The Fund had been publishing the current and deposit accounts of the London 
clearing banks in International Financial Statistics (IFS) since 1948.51  In 1955, with 
some fanfare, it re-launched IFS with a new ‘Monetary Survey’, recasting and 
standardizing the financial statistics of twelve member states (although not yet the 
UK) to provide a ‘ready-made analysis’ that would reveal ‘the proximate causes of 
changes in the money supply’.52  The UK money supply was defined as currency and 
the current accounts (but not deposit accounts) of the London clearing banks.53  While 
there had been some communication over the new presentation, the Bank was 
perturbed: 
 
We were…very surprised and disturbed to see them burst into print in the 
January issue of IFS with an incomprehensible economic introduction and the 
implied promise that this form was to be extended to the UK.  The Fund Staff 
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have clearly badly jumped the gun, and it is now mainly a question of finding 
the best way of undoing the damage.
54
 
 
These were the opening manoeuvres in what Bank officials later referred to as the 
‘Seven Years War’ over UK monetary statistics. 
The first problem was doctrinal, reflecting the British emphasis on liquidity 
rather than the money supply.  If the money supply was relatively unimportant to 
demand management, figures purporting to identify the causes of changes in the 
money supply could be misleading.55  There were also a host of technical problems 
with the Fund’s presentation of the UK monetary statistics.  The first involved the 
treatment of the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA), set up in 1932 to manage the 
UK’s gold and foreign currency reserves following sterling’s exit from the Gold 
Standard (Howson 1980).  While day-to-day management lay with the Bank, 
ownership of the account lay with HM Treasury (the public sector).56  The EEA was 
financed primarily through the issue of Treasury bills; an influx of reserves would 
usually require the authorities to sell more Treasuries, that is, a rise in the reserves 
was generally associated with an increase in the government’s gross liabilities.57  The 
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impact on the money supply would depend upon who bought the Treasury bills.58  If 
the commercial banks bought them, their liquidity ratios would rise (although their 
cash ratios might fall) and the broad money supply would likely increase; if the non-
bank private sector bought them, bank lending and the broad money supply would 
likely be less affected. 
In its efforts to standardise the UK’s statistics with those elsewhere, and to 
forge a reliable link between the balance of payments and the monetary sector, the 
Fund wished to include the EEA in the banking sector of the UK economy (‘as if it 
was financed by the Bank’).59  IMF officials treated sterling payments from the 
government to the EEA (to finance increases in the reserves) as reductions in its net 
liabilities to the banking sector i.e. a rise in the reserves implied a decrease in the 
government’s gross liabilities.60  A change in the reserves might also produce a 
change in the non-bank private sector’s holdings of Treasury bills with little impact 
upon the government’s liabilities to the banking sector.  Also, with the Bank holding 
other Sterling Area countries’ reserves and foreigners’ balances for international 
trade, the EEA could fluctuate for reasons that had little to do with the UK economy.  
The Fund’s approach might identify a monetary stimulus from the government to the 
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banking system where none had taken place.  As Adviser to the Governors (and 
former IMF Assistant Director of Research) Maurice Allen pointed out, ‘the IFS 
presentation does not correspond to the complexities of our overseas banking 
activities and can produce nonsense results when applied to UK figures’.61 
There was a related problem with the Fund’s proposed treatment of the Bank’s 
Issue Department.  Elsewhere, issue departments largely confined their activities to 
issuing bank notes and passing the proceeds on to their governments so could 
logically be treated as part of the public sector.  But the Bank of England’s Issue 
Department also managed the national debt.  This required the Department to hold 
significant and changing amounts of British Government Securities.  As a 
consequence, the Fund proposed to treat the Issue Department as part of the UK 
banking sector.  But in the UK, monetary policy was debt management policy.62  The 
authorities influenced the monetary system mainly through operations on public 
sector debt, with Bank rate directed primarily towards the exchange rate.  The Bank 
described the Fund’s proposal to place its debt management operations in the banking 
sector as leaving the monetary authorities looking like ‘Hamlet minus [the] Prince’.63  
Furthermore, placing the Issue Department in the banking sector would require the 
authorities to reveal the extent of the Bank’s holdings of British Government 
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Securities.64  This was market-sensitive information that might hinder the Bank’s 
ability to execute monetary policy.65 
A further problem was that the information required to show the origins of 
changes in the money supply would require greater disclosure from all sectors 
comprising the ‘monetary system’ as defined by the Fund: the Bank, the clearing 
banks, and ‘other financial institutions’ such as the building societies, the Trustee 
Savings Bank and the Post Office Bank.  This would place an unwelcome statistical 
burden on the entire financial sector.  The 1946 Companies Act permitted the clearing 
banks to withhold information about their reserves which they tended to keep in 
‘Other Accounts’.  The IMF’s new approach might reveal information about these 
reserves, especially embarrassing for the large clearing bank rumoured to have 
suffered heavy losses between 1947 and 1951.66  As Maurice Allen pointed out, ‘for 
the IFS to be in a position to give the analysis of the proximate causes of the change 
in money supply, they would need to know more than we would want to tell them’.67 
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Despite the Bank’s preparedness to ‘go into action’ with the IMF’s Statistics 
Division, a lack of support from other countries necessitated a truce which involved 
the Fund publishing the UK statistics in the pre-1955 format until both sides could 
agree a mutually acceptable format.68  After several further engagements, a delay 
while the Radcliffe Report’s statistical recommendations were implemented, and a 
‘pleasant and profitable visit’ to Washington by the Bank’s head statistician, the Bank 
declared victory when the Fund’s statisticians fell in to line with the UK presentation 
of monetary statistics in the August 1962 IFS.69  The EEA and the Issue Department 
were excluded from the banking sector which was defined as per the Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin.  Current and deposit accounts were both treated as ‘money’.  As 
the Bank’s Deputy Head of Statistics noted: 
 
I am surprised that the IMF have capitulated on the current/deposit A/C battle.  
I would have thought that any understatement of “Money” that would arise 
from excluding Deposit Accounts (and, with them, some balances which are 
in practice operated on as demand deposits) would be considerably less than 
the overstatement arising from inclusion of Deposit accounts (and, with them 
all the truly savings accounts) – i.e. that Deposit Accounts contained more 
savings accounts than disguised deposit accounts.  However, the fund having 
accepted defeat, it would be silly to turn the board around and start the game 
all over again.
70
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The Fund had finally acknowledged what Walter Bagehot had known a century 
before, that ‘the distinction between current and deposit accounts in the UK is not as 
marked as implied by the treatment of one as Money and the other as Quasi-Money; 
deposit accounts are in practice frequently treated by the holders as indistinguishable 
from current accounts’.71 
If the dispute with the Fund had been confined to the presentation of UK 
monetary statistics, it might have remained ‘a statisticians’ wrangle’.72  However the 
UK was fast becoming the largest single user of IMF facilities.  In December 1956, 
the UK drew $561.47 million and secured an additional $738.53 million stand-by 
facility.73  There were further drawings in August 1961 ($1,500 million), November 
1964 ($1,000 million) and May 1965 ($1,400 million).74  Initially these facilities came 
with few conditions attached, partly because UK officials could invoke sterling’s 
reserve currency status.75  As one Treasury official noted in 1959 ‘it would be 
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repugnant to the dignity of a country of the UK’s status’ to have conditions applied to 
IMF loans.76  This was not the case with less-developed nations where, to increase the 
probability of successful economic adjustment (and the IMF’s chances of getting its 
money back), loans were granted ‘only after substantial investigation of the would-be 
borrower’s macroeconomic policies and the collaborative development of a recovery 
program’ (Finch 1989, p. 9).  By 1958, the Fund had phased loans to Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Haiti, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile with the implementation of 
financial programmes.  These rules for developing nations were formalised in 1958 
when the IMF’s Executive Board recommended that Bolivia be denied access to its 
loan facility while it remained in breach of the agreed programme.77  The performance 
targets included limiting central bank credit, chosen because the Fund believed the 
Bolivian central bank could control its balance sheet.  This was the foundation for 
Polak’s Western Hemisphere model. 
The Western Hemisphere model was predicated on the theory that domestic 
credit creation was the primary source of balance of payments disequilibria.    It was 
simple, designed for nations for whom the reliability and even existence of accurate 
financial statistics might be in doubt.78  It was too simple for British officials who 
could continue largely to ignore it until May 1965, despite negotiating a succession of 
stand-by agreements and the large drawings of August 1961 and November 1964.  In 
May 1965, however, with the 1964 stand-by fully drawn and $1.1 billion drawn from 
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a $3 billion facility provided by consortium of central banks falling due, the UK 
government requested an immediate $1.4 billion loan that would take it beyond its 
quota.79  A drawing of this size required the Fund to activate the General 
Arrangements to Borrow negotiated two years earlier with its members.  Given the 
more ‘classical’ monetary views held by a number of European central bankers, this 
meant tougher conditionality. 
 The May 1965 IMF mission was led by Polak.  While he conceded on a 
ceiling for Bank of England credit to the government, he insisted that ‘estimates’ for 
the growth of clearing bank lending and deposits be included in the Letter of Intent.80  
While this did little to endear him to UK officials it is noteworthy that Polak was 
prepared to target commercial bank lending and deposits rather than central bank 
lending.  Previously, IMF performance criteria had almost always related to the 
central bank’s balance sheet.81  Nonetheless the Fund recognised that the choice of 
                                                 
79
 IMF members were allocated a quota comprised of four tranches.  The first tranche (the 
‘gold tranche’) represented the member’s contribution of assets other than its own currency, 
originally gold.  Members drawing on the successive ‘credit tranches’ above the gold tranche 
could expect increasingly stringent conditionality.  The November 1964 drawing had taken 
the UK fractionally beyond its quota; the May 1965 drawing took the UK to 197.4 per cent of 
quota, IMF, R.L. Horne, ‘Minutes of Executive Board meeting 65/25’, 12 May 1965, 
Executive Board Minutes (EBM) 65/25. 
80
 In line with the Fund’s statistical presentation in IFS, Polak initially proposed numerical 
ceilings on London Clearing Bank lending, TNA, T312/1387, J.J. Polak, ‘Monetary policy’, 
14 April 1965. 
81
 Given the importance of commercial bank lending to the Egyptian cotton industry, an 
exception was made for the United Arab Republic’s May 1964 facility, Middle Eastern 
 31 
ceiling depended on the characteristics of each country’s monetary system – ‘a ceiling 
applying to the banking system as a whole may be preferred because its relationship 
to other economic variables, and policy decisions, is clearer’.82  This sold the pass on 
conditionality attached to the growth of the monetary base.  And having conceded in 
1962 that there was less distinction between current and deposit accounts in the UK 
than elsewhere, the pass was sold on conditionality applied to the growth of ‘narrow 
money’. 
Access to the 1965 facility was not phased according to performance criteria.  
Nonetheless, Chancellor James Callaghan undertook to consult the Fund ‘should any 
major shift in the direction or emphasis of economic or financial policy as stated in 
this letter become desirable during the period in which Fund holdings of sterling are 
in excess of 125 per cent of the quota’.83  Since financial policy included ‘an increase 
in advances to the private sector by the London clearing banks in the year ending 
March 1966 of not more than 5 per cent (£230 million), and…an increase in their 
deposits in the same proportion (about £400 million)’, the IMF had imposed loose 
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monetary conditionality on the UK, albeit on a definition of UK officials’ choosing.84  
As Polak explained to the Fund’s Executive Board: 
 
In our discussions we have put primary emphasis on the importance of the 
Government taking a view as to the appropriate amount of credit expansion. 
We considered this more important than the introduction of one specific 
measure of control or another.
85
 
 
The 1967 devaluation. 
 
On 17 November 1967, the British government finally admitted defeat in the defence 
of sterling at the post-1949 Bretton Woods parity of $2.80.  The Fund’s Managing 
Director, Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, reacted ‘without surprise and with little comment’, 
despatching a mission led by its head of Fiscal Affairs, Richard Goode, to London 
armed with a series of policy recommendations. 86  These included a £250 million 
limit on Exchequer borrowing from the banking system and a £500 million ceiling on 
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Domestic Credit Expansion.87  These, the Fund estimated, would be required to 
generate the desired current account surplus over the next year.  Goode immediately 
ran into trouble.  The Chancellor was naturally concerned about the political criticism 
IMF-imposed performance criteria would attract, both from the Conservative 
opposition and from his own backbenchers. 
Bank and Treasury officials’ concerns were more technical.  They argued that if 
the market knew the authorities were missing an IMF target, they could be held to 
ransom, forced to pay a higher rate on the new gilt issues required to get Exchequer 
borrowing from the banking system and DCE back on track.  The Issue Department’s 
management of the national debt was perceived to be a fine art, not conducive to the 
blunt instrument of an IMF performance target.  Moreover, as Maurice Allen pointed 
out, it was impossible to estimate in advance how much the EEA would have to 
borrow from the banks to finance an influx, especially given sterling’s reserve 
currency status.88  Deputy Governor Sir Maurice Parsons also reminded Goode that 
British banking was traditionally reliant on overdrafts which could be drawn at the 
convenience of the borrower.  This made it very difficult for the clearing banks to 
predict the size of future lending and, therefore, their reserves at the Bank.  In short, 
the size of the Bank’s balance sheet, and DCE, simply could not be forecast with any 
degree of precision. 
 
                                                 
87
 IMF, F.A. Southard, ‘UK matter: further conversations and developments – November 17-
18’, 1967, European Department Records, European Department Division Files, EUR 
Divisions Country/Country Desk files, United Kingdom, Box 73, File 4/166.  
88
 BOE, 4A160/5, W.M. Allen, ‘IMF consultations’, 19 November 1967. 
 34 
We tried to explain that it was wrong to apply to the UK with its sophisticated 
monetary system principles and practices which might be perfectly alright for 
the Argentine or a lesser-developed African country.  But even after long 
sessions, we failed to convince Goode and we therefore agreed, in the course 
of the final session between [Permanent Secretary to the Treasury] William 
Armstrong and Goode, that between now and February we would have a 
seminar – presumably in London – which could discuss all these points 
thoroughly without being up against the clock, as we were in preparing the 
Letter of Intent.
89
 
 
While Armstrong was prepared to forego an IMF loan rather than accept DCE 
conditionality, the Bank’s Jeremy Morse conceded that ‘as far as the Bank was 
concerned we would be ready to concede a ‘warning light’ ceiling for money supply 
or for bank credit to the public sector the reaching of which would provoke immediate 
consultations with the Fund’.90  While this was little advance on the loose conditions 
included in the May 1965 Letter of Intent, it helped to extricate the two sides from 
‘the familiar rut for UK-IMF dialogue about our monetary objectives’.91  After 
agreeing a form of words on the Exchequer borrowing requirement, the Fund 
conceded, once again, on the monetary target.  As Maurice Allen noted: 
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the Mission offered us several different ways of binding ourselves to be good 
– sterilising the sterling receipts of EEA; varying the money supply ceiling up 
or down as the EEA went up or down, etc.  Eventually, when they saw that we 
would not allow negotiations to be held up while we argued out at length such 
fundamental issues of principle, they accepted a modified version of Sir 
William Armstrong’s draft mentioning the ‘expectation that…the growth of 
the money supply [on our definition] will be less in 1969 (sic) than the present 
estimate for 1967 both absolutely and as a proportion of GNP’.92 
 
The ‘present estimate’ for 1967/68 was £1.123 billion, or about 8½ per cent of the 
broad money stock.93  As Head of the Economic Service Sir Alec Cairncross later 
pointed out, Armstrong ‘knew that the borrowing requirement was more important to 
[the IMF] than the credit ceilings’ (Cairncross 1997, p. 254).  The ‘fundamental issue 
of principle’ would be discussed at a future date, outside the pressurised atmosphere of 
the loan negotiation.  But the British had succeeded in keeping to their broad 
definition of the money supply. 
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The DCE seminar 
 
The next engagement was the ‘DCE seminar’, proposed by Armstrong, which 
finally took place in October 1968.94  The IMF team was led, once again, by Polak.  
The terms of reference were: ‘to examine the theory of the relationships of financial 
factors on the national income and balance of payments, and the implications of these 
relationships for the techniques of economic forecasting’ (less formally, ‘to strengthen 
the position of those in London who regard financial programming as a useful tool of 
policy’).95  On the first day the seminar considered two papers which defined ‘money’; 
one from the Bank, the other from the CSO.96  Both were in line with the UK’s 
traditional broad definition.  The Fund conceded that ‘what was important was to 
choose a definition which covered all points at which money could be injected into the 
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system and which was not misleading as an indicator’.97  In any event, ‘their prime 
concern was not with the money supply as such’; it was with domestic credit 
expansion – the topic of the second day’s discussion.  Polak explained: 
 
the critical monetary factor in the forecasting process was domestic credit 
expansion.  Preliminary figures could first be set (be it as forecasts or targets) 
for GNP and the balance of payments.  Then, on the assumption of a stable 
income-velocity of circulation, a forecast could be made of the money supply. 
From the balance of payments (change in external assets) and money supply 
forecasts thus obtained, the figure for domestic credit expansion could be 
derived.  The latter in turn could be regarded as a first approximation to the 
additional spending likely to be generated as a result of monetary factors.
98
   
 
There was ‘extended discussion’ on the need to identify the source of the credit 
impulse.  There were also considerable doubts expressed about the stability of the 
income-velocity of circulation, unsurprising at a seminar chaired by a member of the 
Radcliffe Committee (Sir Alec Cairncross) that had declared this to be ‘potentially 
infinite’ with another of its witnesses (Nicky Kaldor) in attendance.  The principal 
disagreement, however, was whether the authorities should be looking at an aggregate 
measure such as DCE or its components.  When asked what the UK reaction to an 
unforeseen increase in the money supply would be, Cairncross replied ‘it would surely 
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be prudent to investigate the reasons for it closely before taking any action beyond 
perhaps some upward adjustment in interest rates’.99 
 There was less dispute over which measure of money should be used.  
Summing up on the final day, Polak conceded that ‘the sensible course seemed to be to 
choose that definition of the money supply which gave the best correlation with 
money income and interest rates, and to extend the authorities’ control to include all 
those institutions whose liabilities fell within this definition’.100  He had earlier noted 
that ‘for the purposes of monetary policy, it was interesting to study what spectrum of 
assets gave the best correlation with GNP and interest rates’.101  Unbeknown to Polak, 
the Bank had already decided to do precisely this.  Notwithstanding the broad money 
supply definition presented to the Fund, and deployed (with minor variations) in 
official publications since 1958, there remained within the Bank ‘a variety of views 
about the money supply’.102  Chief Cashier John Fforde concluded it was time for a 
review (Capie 2010, pp. 452-9).103  Thus was born the Money Supply Group, 
comprised of Kit McMahon, Leslie Dicks-Mireaux, Andrew Crockett, and, newly 
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arrived from the London School of Economics, Charles Goodhart.  This marked the 
onset of a fertile period of monetary research within the Bank, mirroring the 
theoretical investigations underway in academia.  The Group’s work, however, was 
delayed by Chancellor Roy Jenkins’ acceptance of DCE performance criteria in May 
1969.  The 1965 and 1966 drawings from the Fund were falling due and, with the 
current account taking an inexorably long time to recover, the Bank had insufficient 
dollar reserves to repay.  There was little alternative to another stand-by arrangement.  
In response to developing nations’ protests about the lack of strict conditionality 
attached to the UK’s 1967 loan, the Fund had harmonised its stand-by criteria the 
previous September.  There was little doubt that further assistance would require a 
DCE ceiling.104  While detailed negotiations had to wait until after the April 1969 
Budget, to avoid giving the impression that the IMF was dictating policy, a team of 
Bank and Treasury officials was despatched to Washington in February to sound out 
the Fund. 
To some UK irritation, the Fund initially suggested a ceiling on the Bank of 
England’s gross domestic assets, before retreating to ‘the concept of domestic credit of 
the banking system as set out in the monetary survey of IFS’.105  As the Bank’s Jasper 
Hollom pointed out ‘the broad lines on which the application of the Fund’s concept to 
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the UK should be based were agreed without much difficulty’.106  This may have been 
aided by pressure from the Managing Director who, in discussion with UK officials 
over the ceiling, admitted that ‘the UK “must agree to something”.107  But Schweitzer 
seemed flexible on what the ‘something might be’.  The Treasury’s Frank Figgures 
explained that a ceiling based on the broader aggregate would make the Chancellor’s 
job of presentation much easier.  With some minor modifications (and despite their 
own equations showing a more robust relationship between narrow money and 
income), ‘the Fund were perfectly content’.108 
There remained the thorny question of where to set the DCE ceiling.  This 
involved some ‘hard discussion’, a trip by Financial Secretary Harold Lever to 
Washington, and a compromise whereby the performance criteria would be a 
commitment on the part of the UK’s Executive Director at the Fund, rather than the 
Chancellor.  This allowed Jenkins to say ‘honestly that he had not committed to any 
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performance criteria which the Fund staff might enumerate’.109  And instead of a 
breach of the ceiling triggering a visit from the Fund, Jenkins agreed to three further 
surveillance missions.  These would take place regardless of the DCE outcome.  As 
the Economist pointed out, ‘the most important feature of Mr Jenkins’s letter of intent 
to the International Monetary Fund is the thinness of the fig leaf that has been 
stretched over the trigger clause’.110 To further placate his critics, Jenkins pretended 
that DCE was a British invention.   This created an unwelcome diversion for Bank 
and Treasury officials, forced to justify an aggregate initially designed for less 
developed nations that none of them believed had much relevance for the UK.  As 
Goodhart explains: ‘to protect British amour propre there had to be some pretence 
that we, in the UK, had thought up this wonderful new wheeze, rather than had it 
foisted upon us, out of weakness, by the IMF’ (Goodhart 2003, p. 25).  Articles by 
Bank and Treasury officials in 1969 studiously avoided the suggestion that DCE was 
anything other than a British initiative.
111
  The pretence worked, with British 
journalists and American observers taken in (Capie 2010, p. 456). 
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Conclusions 
In 1982, John Fforde wrote: 
 
Specific intermediate targetry was…first introduced in the United Kingdom 
when standby facilities were negotiated with the Fund following the 
devaluation of sterling in 1967…The requirements of the IMF fitted readily 
into the established flow-of-funds accounting matrix and could thereby be 
made analytically consistent and visibly related.
112
 
 
In 1969 the IMF imposed a DCE ceiling on the reluctant British authorities (after 
insisting upon a money supply objective in 1967), but it was a broad variant that fitted 
longstanding British characteristics.  Specifically, it reflected the porous divide 
between current and deposit accounts.  A narrow definition, more attuned to the IMF’s 
Western Hemisphere model would have required root and branch overhaul of, inter 
alia, British banking, monetary policy, management of the national debt and the 
currency reserves, and national accounting conventions.  Faced with British 
intransigence and the need to preserve the Bretton Woods system, the Fund was 
pragmatic in the choice of aggregate, albeit after losing a ‘Seven Year’s War’ with the 
Bank’s statisticians.  Britain entered the economically turbulent 1970s with the focus 
of monetary analysis and management on broad money with its link to fiscal policy 
through the credit counterparts.  This approach would reach its apogee in the Thatcher 
government’s 1980 Medium-Term Financial Strategy, with its four-year series of 
declining £M3 target ranges and deficit ceilings. 
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